Adaptive Bidding Policies for First-Price Auctions with Budget Constraints under Non-stationarity
Yige Wang, Jiashuo Jiang

TL;DR
This paper develops an adaptive bidding policy for first-price auctions with budget constraints, addressing non-stationarity and limited knowledge, and provides regret bounds for different informational settings.
Contribution
It introduces a dual-gradient-descent bidding policy that adapts to budget constraints and non-stationarity, with theoretical regret guarantees under various knowledge assumptions.
Findings
Regret is O(\u221a{T}) plus a non-stationarity variation term.
Prediction of budget allocation reduces regret to O({T}) plus prediction error.
The proposed policy is effective under both unknown and predictive knowledge scenarios.
Abstract
We study how a budget-constrained bidder should learn to adaptively bid in repeated first-price auctions to maximize her cumulative payoff. This problem arose due to an industry-wide shift from second-price auctions to first-price auctions in display advertising recently, which renders truthful bidding (i.e., always bidding one's private value) no longer optimal. We propose a simple dual-gradient-descent-based bidding policy that maintains a dual variable for budget constraint as the bidder consumes her budget. In analysis, we consider two settings regarding the bidder's knowledge of her private values in the future: (i) an uninformative setting where all the distributional knowledge (can be non-stationary) is entirely unknown to the bidder, and (ii) an informative setting where a prediction of the budget allocation in advance. We characterize the performance loss (or regret) relative…
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