Promises Made, Promises Kept: Safe Pareto Improvements via Ex Post Verifiable Commitments
Nathaniel Sauerberg, Caspar Oesterheld

TL;DR
This paper explores how ex post verifiable commitments can ensure safe Pareto improvements in games, analyzing three commitment types and their computational complexity for establishing such improvements.
Contribution
It introduces three novel commitment frameworks—disarmament, token games, and default-conditional commitments—for achieving safe Pareto improvements with verifiable strategies.
Findings
Characterizes the complexity of deciding SPI existence in each setting.
Provides efficient algorithms for some commitment-based SPI problems.
Establishes NP-hardness and Graph Isomorphism-hardness results for SPI decision problems.
Abstract
A safe Pareto improvement (SPI) [41] is a modification of a game that leaves all players better off with certainty. SPIs are typically proven under qualitative assumptions about the way different games are played. For example, we assume that strictly dominated strategies can be iteratively removed and that isomorphic games are played isomorphically. In this work, we study SPIs achieved through three types of ex post verifiable commitments -- promises about player behavior from which deviations can be detected by observing the game. First, we consider disarmament -- commitments not to play certain actions. Next, we consider SPIs based on token games. A token game is a game played by simply announcing an action (via cheap talk). As such, its outcome is intrinsically meaningless. However, we assume the players commit in advance to play specific (pure or correlated) strategy profiles in the…
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Taxonomy
TopicsFormal Methods in Verification
