There must be encapsulated nonconceptual content in vision

TL;DR

This paper argues that visual perception involves an encapsulated nonconceptual content, supported by a grounding problem in perception and the necessity of a visual module for meaningful visual experience.

Contribution

It provides an argument supporting Fodor's thesis that input systems are modular and informationally encapsulated, based on the grounding problem in perception.

Findings

Visual experience requires a visual module for object identification.

Perception involves nonconceptual content that is encapsulated from higher cognition.

The grounding problem supports the existence of informationally encapsulated modules.

Abstract

In this paper I want to propose an argument to support Jerry Fodor's thesis (Fodor 1983) that input systems are modular and thus informationally encapsulated. The argument starts with the suggestion that there is a "grounding problem" in perception, i. e. that there is a problem in explaining how perception that can yield a visual experience is possible, how sensation can become meaningful perception of something for the subject. Given that visual experience is actually possible, this invites a transcendental argument that explains the conditions of its possibility. I propose that one of these conditions is the existence of a visual module in Fodor's sense that allows the step from sensation to object-identifying perception, thus enabling visual experience. It seems to follow that there is informationally encapsulated nonconceptual content in visual perception.