Equilibria and Learning in Modular Marketplaces
Kshipra Bhawalkar, Jeff Dean, Christopher Liaw, Aranyak Mehta, Neel, Patel

TL;DR
This paper explores the design and equilibrium analysis of a modular marketplace where API providers set prices strategically, and a platform aggregates outputs, demonstrating that efficient approximate equilibria exist and can be learned through decentralized algorithms.
Contribution
It introduces a market model with strategic API pricing, proves the existence of near-optimal equilibria under a specific algorithm, and shows these equilibria can be learned via no-regret algorithms.
Findings
Existence of ε-approximate equilibria under the bang-per-buck algorithm.
Equilibria provide constant-factor approximation to the optimal buyer value.
Decentralized no-regret learning algorithms can find these equilibria.
Abstract
We envision a marketplace where diverse entities offer specialized "modules" through APIs, allowing users to compose the outputs of these modules for complex tasks within a given budget. This paper studies the market design problem in such an ecosystem, where module owners strategically set prices for their APIs (to maximize their profit) and a central platform orchestrates the aggregation of module outputs at query-time. One can also think about this as a first-price procurement auction with budgets. The first observation is that if the platform's algorithm is to find the optimal set of modules then this could result in a poor outcome, in the sense that there are price equilibria which provide arbitrarily low value for the user. We show that under a suitable version of the "bang-per-buck" algorithm for the knapsack problem, an -approximate equilibrium always exists, for…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Applications · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing
