Intrinsic Model Weaknesses: How Priming Attacks Unveil Vulnerabilities in Large Language Models
Yuyi Huang, Runzhe Zhan, Derek F. Wong, Lidia S. Chao, Ailin Tao

TL;DR
This paper reveals fundamental vulnerabilities in large language models by demonstrating that novel priming attack strategies can consistently bypass safety mechanisms, exposing risks of harmful content generation.
Contribution
Introduces new attack techniques inspired by psychological phenomena to expose weaknesses in LLM safety guards, with high success rates on diverse models.
Findings
100% attack success rate on open-source models
At least 95% success rate on closed-source models
Highlights societal risks of deploying LLMs without robust safeguards
Abstract
Large language models (LLMs) have significantly influenced various industries but suffer from a critical flaw, the potential sensitivity of generating harmful content, which poses severe societal risks. We developed and tested novel attack strategies on popular LLMs to expose their vulnerabilities in generating inappropriate content. These strategies, inspired by psychological phenomena such as the "Priming Effect", "Safe Attention Shift", and "Cognitive Dissonance", effectively attack the models' guarding mechanisms. Our experiments achieved an attack success rate (ASR) of 100% on various open-source models, including Meta's Llama-3.2, Google's Gemma-2, Mistral's Mistral-NeMo, Falcon's Falcon-mamba, Apple's DCLM, Microsoft's Phi3, and Qwen's Qwen2.5, among others. Similarly, for closed-source models such as OpenAI's GPT-4o, Google's Gemini-1.5, and Claude-3.5, we observed an ASR of at…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAdversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
MethodsSoftmax · Attention Is All You Need
