Multi-Party Data Pricing for Complex Data Trading Markets: A Rubinstein Bargaining Approach

TL;DR

This paper introduces a multi-party data pricing model based on Rubinstein bargaining, considering data utility, quality, and buyer satisfaction to improve fairness and accuracy in complex data trading markets.

Contribution

It develops a novel multi-party pricing framework incorporating buyer satisfaction and data quality, addressing limitations of existing single-factor models.

Findings

Effectively mitigates data monopoly pricing issues.

Demonstrates high accuracy and applicability in multi-seller, multi-buyer scenarios.

Provides a practical and theoretically sound data pricing mechanism.

Abstract

With the rapid development of Internet of Things (IoT) and artificial intelligence technologies, data has become an important strategic resource in the new era. However, the growing demand for data has exacerbated the issue of \textit{data silos}. Existing data pricing models primarily focus on single factors such as data quality or market demand, failing to adequately address issues such as data seller monopolies and the diverse needs of buyers, resulting in biased pricing that cannot meet the complexities of evolving transaction scenarios. To address these problems, this paper proposes a multi-party data pricing model based on the Rubinstein bargaining model. The model introduces buyer data utility indicators and data quality assessments, comprehensively considering factors such as the utility, accuracy, and timeliness of data sets, to more accurately evaluate their value to buyers. To overcome the limitations of single-factor models, this paper innovatively introduces the buyer data set satisfaction indicator, which reflects the overall satisfaction of buyers with data sets by integrating both data utility and quality assessments. Based on this, the model uses the Rubinstein bargaining model to simulate the pricing process between multiple sellers and multiple buyers, yielding pricing results that better align with market demands. Experimental results show that the proposed model effectively addresses the pricing imbalance caused by data monopolies and demonstrates good applicability and accuracy in multi-seller, multi-buyer transaction environments. This research provides an effective pricing mechanism for complex data trading markets and has significant theoretical and practical value in solving pricing issues in actual data transactions.