Moshi Moshi? A Model Selection Hijacking Adversarial Attack
Riccardo Petrucci, Luca Pajola, Francesco Marchiori, Luca Pasa, Mauro, conti

TL;DR
This paper introduces MOSHI, a novel adversarial attack targeting the model selection process in machine learning, revealing significant vulnerabilities that can degrade performance and increase operational costs.
Contribution
We propose MOSHI, the first attack specifically designed to hijack model selection, demonstrating its effectiveness across multiple tasks and settings without prior system knowledge.
Findings
75.42% attack success rate
88.30% decrease in generalization
105.85% increase in energy consumption
Abstract
Model selection is a fundamental task in Machine Learning~(ML), focusing on selecting the most suitable model from a pool of candidates by evaluating their performance on specific metrics. This process ensures optimal performance, computational efficiency, and adaptability to diverse tasks and environments. Despite its critical role, its security from the perspective of adversarial ML remains unexplored. This risk is heightened in the Machine-Learning-as-a-Service model, where users delegate the training phase and the model selection process to third-party providers, supplying data and training strategies. Therefore, attacks on model selection could harm both the user and the provider, undermining model performance and driving up operational costs. In this work, we present MOSHI (MOdel Selection HIjacking adversarial attack), the first adversarial attack specifically targeting model…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsAdversarial Robustness in Machine Learning · Advanced Malware Detection Techniques · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence
