Learning Bayesian Game Families, with Application to Mechanism Design
Madelyn Gatchel, Michael P. Wellman

TL;DR
This paper introduces an interim game-family modeling approach for Bayesian games that improves data efficiency and extrapolation in mechanism design, demonstrated through a dynamic auction case study.
Contribution
It proposes a novel interim modeling method that conditions on a single player's type, outperforming traditional ex ante models in accuracy and extrapolation.
Findings
Interim models match ex ante models on trained data range.
Interim models outperform ex ante models in extrapolation.
Method enables new strategic computations without additional data.
Abstract
Learning or estimating game models from data typically entails inducing separate models for each setting, even if the games are parametrically related. In empirical mechanism design, for example, this approach requires learning a new game model for each candidate setting of the mechanism parameter. Recent work has shown the data efficiency benefits of learning a single parameterized model for families of related games. In Bayesian games -- a typical model for mechanism design -- payoffs depend on both the actions and types of the players. We show how to exploit this structure by learning an interim game-family model that conditions on a single player's type. We compare this to the baseline approach of directly learning the ex ante payoff function, which gives payoffs in expectation of all player types. By marginalizing over player type, the interim model can also provide ex ante payoff…
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