Causes and Strategies in Multiagent Systems
Sylvia S. Kerkhove, Natasha Alechina, Mehdi Dastani

TL;DR
This paper introduces a formal framework combining causality and multi-agent systems using causal concurrent game structures, enabling analysis of how agents' strategic decisions influence causal outcomes.
Contribution
It presents a novel method to model multi-agent systems with causality, integrating structural causal models with game-theoretic structures for strategic analysis.
Findings
Framework effectively models causal effects in multi-agent settings
Enables reasoning about strategic interventions and their impacts
Formal relations established between causal models and game structures
Abstract
Causality plays an important role in daily processes, human reasoning, and artificial intelligence. There has however not been much research on causality in multi-agent strategic settings. In this work, we introduce a systematic way to build a multi-agent system model, represented as a concurrent game structure, for a given structural causal model. In the obtained so-called causal concurrent game structure, transitions correspond to interventions on agent variables of the given causal model. The Halpern and Pearl framework of causality is used to determine the effects of a certain value for an agent variable on other variables. The causal concurrent game structure allows us to analyse and reason about causal effects of agents' strategic decisions. We formally investigate the relation between causal concurrent game structures and the original structural causal models.
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Taxonomy
TopicsMulti-Agent Systems and Negotiation
