Should I Trust You? Detecting Deception in Negotiations using Counterfactual RL
Wichayaporn Wongkamjan, Yanze Wang, Feng Gu, Denis Peskoff, Jonathan K. Kummerfeld, Jonathan May, Jordan Lee Boyd-Graber

TL;DR
This paper presents a novel AI approach using counterfactual reinforcement learning to detect deception in negotiations, specifically in strategic communication within the game Diplomacy, enhancing trust and decision-making.
Contribution
It introduces a method combining logical form extraction, value function analysis, and text features for improved deception detection in strategic negotiations.
Findings
High precision in detecting human deception
Outperforms Large Language Model baseline
Potential for AI-assisted trust verification tools
Abstract
An increasingly common socio-technical problem is people being taken in by offers that sound ``too good to be true'', where persuasion and trust shape decision-making. This paper investigates how \abr{ai} can help detect these deceptive scenarios. We analyze how humans strategically deceive each other in \textit{Diplomacy}, a board game that requires both natural language communication and strategic reasoning. This requires extracting logical forms of proposed agreements in player communications and computing the relative rewards of the proposal using agents' value functions. Combined with text-based features, this can improve our deception detection. Our method detects human deception with a high precision when compared to a Large Language Model approach that flags many true messages as deceptive. Future human-\abr{ai} interaction tools can build on our methods for deception detection…
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Taxonomy
TopicsInformation and Cyber Security · Network Security and Intrusion Detection · Cybercrime and Law Enforcement Studies
