Rational Capability in Concurrent Games

TL;DR

This paper introduces a framework for modeling rational behavior in concurrent games by extending game structures with preferences and dominance, and explores logical languages to reason about rational capabilities.

Contribution

It extends concurrent game structures with preferences and dominance, and develops logical languages with modalities for rational capabilities, analyzing their complexity and axiomatization.

Findings

Complexity results for satisfiability and model checking

Axiomatization of the extended logical languages

Framework for rational capability in concurrent games

Abstract

We extend concurrent game structures (CGSs) with a simple notion of preference over computations and define a minimal notion of rationality for agents based on the concept of dominance. We use this notion to interpret a CL and an ATL languages that extend the basic CL and ATL languages with modalities for rational capability, namely, a coalition's capability to rationally enforce a given property. For each of these languages, we provide results about the complexity of satisfiability checking and model checking as well as about axiomatization.