Multi-agent coordination via communication partitions

TL;DR

This paper explores how communication partitions among self-interested agents can facilitate coordination to achieve social optimal outcomes in decentralized systems with multiple Nash equilibria.

Contribution

It introduces the concept of communication partitions and demonstrates their effectiveness in inducing efficient, envy-free, and Pareto-optimal outcomes in symmetric singleton congestion games.

Findings

Certain communication partitions induce social optimal outcomes.

Communication partitions can resolve deadlocks in multi-equilibrium settings.

Effective in decentralized, anonymous resource-sharing systems.

Abstract

Coordinating the behaviour of self-interested agents in the presence of multiple Nash equilibria is a major research challenge for multi-agent systems. Pre-game communication between all the players can aid coordination in cases where the Pareto-optimal payoff is unique, but can lead to deadlocks when there are multiple payoffs on the Pareto frontier. We consider a communication partition, where only players within the same coalition can communicate with each other, and they can establish an agreement (a coordinated joint-action) if it is envy-free, credible, and Pareto-optimal. We show that under a natural assumption about symmetry, certain communication partitions can induce social optimal outcomes in singleton congestion games. This game is a reasonable model for a decentralised, anonymous system where players are required to choose from a range of identical resources, and incur costs that are increasing and convex in the total number of players sharing the same resource. The communication partition can be seen as a mechanism for inducing efficient outcomes in this context.