Transaction Fee Market Design for Parallel Execution
Bahar Acilan, Andrei Constantinescu, Lioba Heimbach, Roger Wattenhofer

TL;DR
This paper proposes new fee market designs and mechanisms to incentivize parallel transaction execution in blockchains, aiming to improve scalability by aligning transaction fees with parallelization load.
Contribution
It introduces a framework with a Gas Computation Mechanism and a Transaction Fee Mechanism, and evaluates candidate mechanisms for efficient parallel execution incentive alignment.
Findings
Weighted area GCM integrates with existing fee mechanisms and satisfies key properties.
Time-proportional makespan GCM captures parallel execution dynamics more accurately.
Proposed mechanisms can improve blockchain scalability through better fee market design.
Abstract
Given the low throughput of blockchains like Bitcoin and Ethereum, scalability - the ability to process an increasing number of transactions - has become a central focus of blockchain research. One promising approach is the parallelization of transaction execution across multiple threads. However, achieving efficient parallelization requires a redesign of the incentive structure within the fee market. Currently, the fee market does not differentiate between transactions that access multiple high-demand storage keys (i.e., unique identifiers for individual data entries) versus a single low-demand one, as long as they require the same computational effort. Addressing this discrepancy is crucial for enabling more effective parallel execution. In this work, we aim to bridge the gap between the current fee market and the need for parallel execution by exploring alternative fee market…
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