Streamlining Equal Shares
Sonja Kraiczy, Isaac Robinson, Edith Elkind

TL;DR
This paper introduces an efficient heuristic for the Exact Equal Shares method in participatory budgeting, reducing computational complexity and improving budget utilization compared to existing heuristics.
Contribution
It proposes the add-opt heuristic for EES, enabling faster identification of outcome-changing budgets and better budget expenditure without exhaustive search.
Findings
add-opt heuristic is more efficient than add-one heuristic
EES outcomes typically match MES in budget proportion
add-opt heuristic closely replicates add-one performance
Abstract
Participatory budgeting (PB) is a form of citizen participation that allows citizens to decide how public funds are spent. Through an election, citizens express their preferences on various projects (spending proposals). A voting mechanism then determines which projects will be approved. The Method of Equal Shares (MES) is the state of the art algorithm for a proportional, voting based approach to participatory budgeting and has been implemented in cities across Poland and Switzerland. A significant drawback of MES is that it is not \textit{exhaustive} meaning that it often leaves a portion of the budget unspent that could be used to fund additional projects. To address this, in practice the algorithm is combined with a completion heuristic - most often the ``add-one" heuristic which artificially increases the budget until a heuristically chosen threshold. This heuristic is…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Constraint Satisfaction and Optimization · Complexity and Algorithms in Graphs
