Single-dimensional Contract Design: Efficient Algorithms and Learning
Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli

TL;DR
This paper introduces efficient algorithms for single-dimensional Bayesian contract design, providing an additive PTAS and demonstrating that learning optimal contracts is computationally easier than in multi-dimensional settings.
Contribution
It offers the first additive PTAS for single-dimensional contract design and shows that learning these contracts is more efficient than in multi-dimensional cases.
Findings
An additive PTAS exists for single-dimensional contract design.
No additive FPTAS can exist for these problems.
Optimal contracts can be learned efficiently with favorable regret and sample complexity.
Abstract
We study a Bayesian contract design problem in which a principal interacts with an unknown agent. We consider the single-parameter uncertainty model introduced by Alon et al. [2021], in which the agent's type is described by a single parameter, i.e., the cost per unit-of-effort. Despite its simplicity, several works have shown that single-dimensional contract design is not necessarily easier than its multi-dimensional counterpart in many respects. Perhaps the most surprising result is the reduction by Castiglioni et al . [2025] from multi- to single-dimensional contract design. However, their reduction preserves only multiplicative approximations, leaving open the question of whether additive approximations are easier to obtain than multiplicative ones. In this paper, we answer this question -- to some extent -- positively. In particular, we provide an additive PTAS for these problems…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications
