ALGEN: Few-shot Inversion Attacks on Textual Embeddings using Alignment and Generation
Yiyi Chen, Qiongkai Xu, Johannes Bjerva

TL;DR
ALGEN demonstrates that with minimal data, it is possible to perform effective inversion attacks on textual embeddings, revealing sensitive information and exposing vulnerabilities in LLM-based systems.
Contribution
This paper introduces ALGEN, a novel few-shot inversion attack method that aligns embeddings and generates text without extensive training data, challenging existing defense mechanisms.
Findings
Effective transferability across domains and languages
Successful inversion with as few as 1,000 samples
Existing defenses are ineffective against ALGEN attacks
Abstract
With the growing popularity of Large Language Models (LLMs) and vector databases, private textual data is increasingly processed and stored as numerical embeddings. However, recent studies have proven that such embeddings are vulnerable to inversion attacks, where original text is reconstructed to reveal sensitive information. Previous research has largely assumed access to millions of sentences to train attack models, e.g., through data leakage or nearly unrestricted API access. With our method, a single data point is sufficient for a partially successful inversion attack. With as little as 1k data samples, performance reaches an optimum across a range of black-box encoders, without training on leaked data. We present a Few-shot Textual Embedding Inversion Attack using ALignment and GENeration (ALGEN), by aligning victim embeddings to the attack space and using a generative model to…
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Taxonomy
TopicsHate Speech and Cyberbullying Detection · Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning · Topic Modeling
