A new lower bound for multi-color discrepancy with applications to fair division

TL;DR

This paper establishes a new lower bound for multi-color discrepancy, showing inherent limitations in fair division problems with indivisible items, and improves upon previous bounds with potential applications in equitable resource allocation.

Contribution

It introduces a tighter lower bound for multi-color discrepancy and applies this to demonstrate infeasibility results in fair division scenarios, advancing theoretical understanding.

Findings

New lower bound for multi-color discrepancy: 5(rac{n}{\u2206rac{1}{ ext{k}}})

Infeasibility of consensus /k-division for certain discrepancy levels

Infeasibility of envy-freeness and proportionality up to specific bounds

Abstract

A classical problem in combinatorics seeks colorings of low discrepancy. More concretely, the goal is to color the elements of a set system so that the number of appearances of any color among the elements in each set is as balanced as possible. We present a new lower bound for multi-color discrepancy, showing that there is a set system with $n$ subsets over a set of elements in which any $k$-coloring of the elements has discrepancy at least $\Omega\left(\sqrt{\frac{n}{\ln{k}}}\right)$. This result improves the previously best-known lower bound of $\Omega\left(\sqrt{\frac{n}{k}}\right)$ of Doerr and Srivastav [2003] and may have several applications. Here, we explore its implications on the feasibility of fair division concepts for instances with $n$ agents having valuations for a set of indivisible items. The first such concept is known as consensus $1/k$-division up to $d$ items (\cd$d$) and aims to allocate the items into $k$ bundles so that no matter which bundle each agent is assigned to, the allocation is envy-free up to $d$ items. The above lower bound implies that \cd$d$ can be infeasible for $d\in \Omega\left(\sqrt{\frac{n}{\ln{k}}}\right)$. We furthermore extend our proof technique to show that there exist instances of the problem of allocating indivisible items to $k$ groups of $n$ agents in total so that envy-freeness and proportionality up to $d$ items are infeasible for $d\in \Omega\left(\sqrt{\frac{n}{k\ln{k}}}\right)$ and $d\in \Omega\left(\sqrt{\frac{n}{k^3\ln{k}}}\right)$, respectively. The lower bounds for fair division improve the currently best-known ones by Manurangsi and Suksompong [2022].