Optimal ambition in business, politics and life
Ekaterina Landgren, Ryan E. Langendorf, Matthew G. Burgess

TL;DR
This paper mathematically formalizes folk wisdom on setting ambition levels, showing that optimal satisfaction thresholds are finite, above the mean reward, and influenced by search time, reward landscape, and social comparison.
Contribution
The paper introduces a formal model of ambition and search strategies, extending folk wisdom with rigorous proofs and analyzing factors affecting optimal satisfaction thresholds.
Findings
Optimal satisfaction threshold is finite and above the mean reward.
Being overly ambitious incurs higher expected costs than being cautious.
Longer search times and certain reward landscape features increase optimal ambition.
Abstract
In business, politics and life, folk wisdom encourages people to aim for above-average results, but to not let the perfect be the enemy of the good. Here, we mathematically formalize and extend this folk wisdom. We model a time-limited search for strategies having uncertain rewards. At each time step, the searcher either is satisfied with their current reward or continues searching. We prove that the optimal satisfaction threshold is both finite and strictly larger than the mean of available rewards -- matching the folk wisdom. This result is robust to search costs, unless they are high enough to prohibit all search. We show that being too ambitious has a higher expected cost than being too cautious. We show that the optimal satisfaction threshold increases if the search time is longer, or if the reward distribution is rugged (i.e., has low autocorrelation) or left-skewed. The skewness…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence
