Representation and Interpretation in Artificial and Natural Computing

TL;DR

This paper explores the differences between artificial and natural computing modes, proposing that natural computing might involve a fundamentally different mode that could explain consciousness, challenging traditional computational theories.

Contribution

It introduces the concept of diverse modes of computing beyond the algorithmic, including hypothetical natural computing modes that could be more powerful than Turing machines.

Findings

Artificial computing transforms representations objectively, interpreted subjectively by humans.

Different modes of computing, such as quantum or non-conventional, could surpass algorithmic limits.

The existence of natural computing modes may be linked to the phenomenological experience and consciousness.

Abstract

Artificial computing machinery transforms representations through an objective process, to be interpreted subjectively by humans, so the machine and the interpreter are different entities, but in the putative natural computing both processes are performed by the same agent. The method or process that transforms a representation is called here the mode of computing. The mode used by digital computers is the algorithmic one, but there are others, such as quantum computers and diverse forms of non-conventional computing, and there is an open-ended set of representational formats and modes that could be used in artificial and natural computing. A mode based on a notion of computing different from Turing's may perform feats beyond what the Turing Machine does but the modes would not be of the same kind and could not be compared. For a mode of computing to be more powerful than the algorithmic one, it ought to compute functions lacking an effective algorithm, and Church Thesis would not hold. Here, a thought experiment including a computational demon using a hypothetical mode for such an effect is presented. If there is natural computing, there is a mode of natural computing whose properties may be causal to the phenomenological experience. Discovering it would come with solving the hard problem of consciousness; but if it turns out that such a mode does not exist, there is no such thing as natural computing, and the mind is not a computational process.