Strategyproof Maximum Matching under Dichotomous Agent Preferences

TL;DR

This paper introduces a new matching mechanism for two-sided markets with dichotomous preferences that is strategyproof, fair, Pareto-efficient, and runs in polynomial time, addressing an open problem in market design.

Contribution

It proposes a novel mechanism that simultaneously achieves strategyproofness, maximum matching size, fairness, and non-bossiness in dichotomous preference settings.

Findings

Mechanism is strategyproof for both sides.

Mechanism guarantees maximum size and fairness.

Runs in polynomial time.

Abstract

We consider a two-sided matching problem in which the agents on one side have dichotomous preferences and the other side representing institutions has strict preferences (priorities). It captures several important applications in matching market design in which the agents are only interested in getting matched to an acceptable institution. These include centralized daycare assignment and healthcare rationing. We present a compelling new mechanism that satisfies many prominent and desirable properties including individual rationality, maximum size, fairness, Pareto-efficiency on both sides, strategyproofness on both sides, non-bossiness and having polynomial time running time. As a result, we answer an open problem whether there exists a mechanism that is agent-strategyproof, maximum, fair and non-bossy.