Fair Division via Resource Augmentation
Hannaneh Akrami, Siddharth Barman, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Yoav Gal-Tzur, Satyanand Rammohan, Aditi Sethia

TL;DR
This paper explores how adding multiple copies of goods can ensure fair division among agents, establishing tight bounds and new approximation guarantees for maximin share fairness under various valuation models.
Contribution
It formalizes resource augmentation for MMS fairness, providing tight bounds, new approximation guarantees, and connecting MMS with 1-out-of-d MMS, advancing understanding of fair division with copies.
Findings
Exact MMS allocation with Θ(m/e) copies for general valuations.
At most n-2 copies suffice for additive valuations.
Floor(n/2) copies guarantee 6/7-approximation for additive valuations.
Abstract
We introduce and formalize the notion of resource augmentation for maximin share (MMS) fairness for the allocation of indivisible goods. Given an instance with agents and goods, we ask how many copies of the goods should be added in order to guarantee that each agent receives at least their original MMS value, or a meaningful approximation thereof. For general monotone valuations, we establish a tight bound: an exact MMS allocation can be guaranteed using at most total copies, and this bound is tight even for XOS valuations. We further show that it is unavoidable to duplicate some goods times, and provide matching upper bounds. For additive valuations, we show that at most distinct copies suffice. This separates additive valuations from submodular valuations, for which we show that …
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems
