On the causal efficacy of qualia: Philosophical zombies are fine-tuned, and implications for the quantum measurement theory

TL;DR

This paper proposes that qualia have a causal role in quantum mechanics, affecting the beables or collapse process, and introduces a fine-tuning argument that challenges epiphenomenalism and the philosophical zombie hypothesis.

Contribution

It introduces a model where qualia influence quantum states and suggests fine-tuning as a test for consciousness, challenging traditional views on physicalism and epiphenomenalism.

Findings

Qualia can causally influence quantum processes.

Standard collapse models may need modification to account for qualia.

Fine-tuning of initial conditions explains the unlikelihood of philosophical zombies.

Abstract

We suggest that qualia have a causally efficacious role in quantum mechanics; an occurrence which explains how information about qualia can enter the physical environment. This is compatible with the unitary time-evolution of the quantum state if qualia are understood as effecting the beables of the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation or wavefunction collapse process rather than at the wavefunction level. We furthermore suggest that not all quantum states are consistent with qualia. If this is the case, the standard wavefunction collapse postulates of the Copenhagen interpretation will fail to select only those states which are consistent with qualia, and the Born-rule must be modified if wavefunction collapse is to generate the correct dynamical histories across time. This new model which includes qualia clearly demonstrates how non-linear and self-referential phenomena can occur, despite the linear, deterministic time-evolution of the wavefunction. We reject the notion that physical matter operates independently of qualia, and find that the main evidence for epiphenomenalism i.e. the causal closure of the underlying physical time-evolution, has failed to take into consideration fine-tuning of the microcausal degrees of freedom. We propose that the philosophical zombie argument is fine-tuned in the initial conditions, thus making philosophical zombies statistically unlikely if the fine-tuning is removed. We furthermore suggest the presence of fine-tuning can be used as a test for consciousness in the general case. This explains why some classical processes such as computer circuits may never be conscious; because they lack the capacity for fine-tuning when the dynamics is reversed.