On the distinction between beables and qualia
Adam Brownstein

TL;DR
This paper explores the relationship between beables in the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation of quantum mechanics and qualia, proposing a reflexive link that may shed light on the hard problem of consciousness.
Contribution
It introduces a novel reflexive argument linking beables and qualia, suggesting their mutual necessity in understanding consciousness within quantum interpretations.
Findings
Beables are related but not identical to qualia.
Qualia are necessary for the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation.
The reflexive relationship supports addressing the hard problem of consciousness.
Abstract
The link between the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation and the hard problem of consciousness is investigated. We highlight that beables of the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation are not themselves qualia, but are intimately related to qualia. It is then argued that qualia are necessary for the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation, and conversely the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation (or similar theories) are necessary for qualia. Therefore, there is a reflexive two-way relationship between the beables of the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation and qualia such that they support the existence of each other. By using this reflexive argument, the hard problem of consciousness can be addressed via an indirect route.
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Taxonomy
TopicsPhilosophy and Theoretical Science
