Backflash Attack on Coherent One-Way Quantum Key Distribution

TL;DR

This paper experimentally demonstrates how an eavesdropper can exploit backflash photons from detectors in a quantum key distribution system to gain information, highlighting a security vulnerability and discussing potential mitigation strategies.

Contribution

It provides the first experimental quantification of Eve's information gain via backflash photons in a complete QKD system including key distillation.

Findings

Eve can successfully extract information using backflash photons.

Experimental results align with theoretical models.

Mitigation strategies can reduce backflash attack risks.

Abstract

In this article, we experimentally demonstrate an eavesdropper's (Eve's) information gain by exploiting the breakdown flash generated by the single photon avalanche detector (SPAD) used in coherent one-way quantum key distribution (COW-QKD) setup. Unlike prior studies focusing on the device-level characterization of backflash photons, this work quantifies Eve's learning with a QKD system that includes a key distillation engine (KDE). Eve's learning is quantified using the backflash photons emitted by SPAD and the information available on the classical channel. Experimentally observed data are in good agreement with theoretical simulations. Some mitigation strategies against the backflash attack are also discussed.