Explanation Design in Strategic Learning: Sufficient Explanations that Induce Non-harmful Responses
Kiet Q. H. Vo, Siu Lun Chau, Masahiro Kato, Yixin Wang, Krikamol Muandet

TL;DR
This paper explores how to design explanations in algorithmic decision-making that prevent strategic agents from taking harmful actions, proposing a method that balances model accuracy with agent utility.
Contribution
It introduces a necessary condition for explanations to avoid misleading agents and demonstrates that action recommendation explanations can ensure non-harmful responses under certain assumptions.
Findings
ARexes enable safe partial model disclosure.
Proposed learning procedure jointly optimizes model and explanations.
Experiments show improved predictive performance and agent utility.
Abstract
We study explanation design in algorithmic decision making with strategic agents, individuals who may modify their inputs in response to explanations of a decision maker's (DM's) predictive model. As the demand for transparent algorithmic systems continues to grow, most prior work assumes full model disclosure as the default solution. In practice, however, DMs such as financial institutions typically disclose only partial model information via explanations. Such partial disclosure can lead agents to misinterpret the model and take actions that unknowingly harm their utility. A key open question is how DMs can communicate explanations in a way that avoids harming strategic agents, while still supporting their own decision-making goals, e.g., minimising predictive error. In this work, we analyse well-known explanation methods, and establish a necessary condition to prevent explanations…
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Taxonomy
TopicsComplex Systems and Decision Making
