Cooperative Behavior in Pre-State Societies: An Agent-Based Approach of the Aksum Civilization

TL;DR

This paper uses agent-based modeling to explore how cooperation could have emerged in early Aksum society without centralized coercive power, highlighting the potential for non-hierarchical social structures to sustain cooperation temporarily.

Contribution

It introduces an agent-based approach to test the hypothesis that early Aksum society lacked centralized authority, challenging traditional views on state formation.

Findings

Cooperation can emerge without coercive power in the short term.

Long-term stability of cooperation likely requires centralized authority.

Insights into pathways of social complexity and state formation.

Abstract

This study intends to test the hypothesis that, contrary to traditional interpretation, the social structure of the polity of Aksum - especially in its early stages - was not characterized by a vertical hierarchy with highly centralized administrative power, and that the leaders mentioned in the few available inscriptions were predominantly ritual leaders with religious rather than coercive political authority. This hypothesis, suggested by the available archaeological evidence, is grounded in Charles Stanish's model, which posits that pre-state societies could achieve cooperative behavior without the presence of coercive authority. Using agent-based modeling applied to data inspired by the Aksum civilization, we examine the dynamics of cooperation in the presence and absence of a Public Goods Game. Results show that while cooperative behavior can emerge in the short term without coercive power, it may not be sustainable over the long term, suggesting a need for centralized authority to foster stable, complex societies. These findings provide insights into the evolutionary pathways that lead to state formation and complex social structures.