The Cost Perspective of Liquid Democracy: Feasibility and Control

TL;DR

This paper analyzes the feasibility and control aspects of Liquid Democracy when considering costs and strategic influences, focusing on computational complexity and representation issues.

Contribution

It introduces a cost-aware model of Liquid Democracy and studies its computational complexity for cost minimization and strategic control.

Findings

Cost minimization is computationally challenging.

Strategies can influence voting power distribution.

Ensuring representation while controlling costs is complex.

Abstract

We examine an approval-based model of Liquid Democracy with a budget constraint on voting and delegating costs, aiming to centrally select casting voters ensuring complete representation of the electorate. From a computational complexity perspective, we focus on minimizing overall costs, maintaining short delegation paths, and preventing excessive concentration of voting power. Furthermore, we explore computational aspects of strategic control, specifically, whether external agents can change election components to influence the voting power of certain voters.