Graph-based Impact Analysis of Cyber-Attacks on Behind-the-Meter Infrastructure
Immanuel Hacker (1, 2), \"Omer Sen (1, 2), Florian, Klein-Helmkamp (2), Andreas Ulbig (1, 2) ((1) Digital Energy at Fraunhofer, FIT, (2) IAEW at RWTH Aachen)

TL;DR
This paper introduces a graph model to analyze the impact of cyber-attacks on behind-the-meter energy infrastructure, highlighting interdependencies and potential system-wide effects.
Contribution
It presents a novel graph-based approach to model cyber-physical interdependencies for impact analysis of cyber-attacks on energy systems.
Findings
Cyber-attacks can significantly affect power system stability.
Interdependencies increase vulnerability to cyber-attacks.
Graph model effectively identifies critical attack vectors.
Abstract
Behind-the-Meter assets are getting more interconnected to realise new applications like flexible tariffs. Cyber-attacks on the resulting control infrastructure may impact a large number of devices, which can result in severe impact on the power system. To analyse the possible impact of such attacks we developed a graph model of the cyber-physical energy system, representing interdependencies between the control infrastructure and the power system. This model is than used for an impact analysis of cyber-attacks with different attack vectors.
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Taxonomy
TopicsSmart Grid Security and Resilience · Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting · Network Security and Intrusion Detection
