Bottom-Up Reputation Promotes Cooperation with Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning
Tianyu Ren, Xuan Yao, Yang Li, Xiao-Jun Zeng

TL;DR
This paper introduces LR2, a bottom-up reputation learning method that enhances cooperation in multi-agent systems by shaping rewards based on local reputation assessments without relying on predefined norms.
Contribution
The paper proposes a novel bottom-up reputation learning approach, LR2, which promotes cooperation through local reputation-based reward shaping without centralized control or predefined norms.
Findings
LR2 effectively promotes cooperation across various social dilemma scenarios.
LR2 stabilizes cooperation and fosters strategy clustering in structured populations.
Reputation-based reward shaping improves cooperation without centralized norms.
Abstract
Reputation serves as a powerful mechanism for promoting cooperation in multi-agent systems, as agents are more inclined to cooperate with those of good social standing. While existing multi-agent reinforcement learning methods typically rely on predefined social norms to assign reputations, the question of how a population reaches a consensus on judgement when agents hold private, independent views remains unresolved. In this paper, we propose a novel bottom-up reputation learning method, Learning with Reputation Reward (LR2), designed to promote cooperative behaviour through rewards shaping based on assigned reputation. Our agent architecture includes a dilemma policy that determines cooperation by considering the impact on neighbours, and an evaluation policy that assigns reputations to affect the actions of neighbours while optimizing self-objectives. It operates using local…
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Taxonomy
TopicsEvolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
