On the Core of the $b$-Matching Game
Rohith Reddy Gangam, Shayan Taherijam, Vijay V. Vazirani

TL;DR
This paper proves that determining whether a given imputation lies in the core of the b-matching game is co-NP-hard, resolving an open question in cooperative game theory.
Contribution
It establishes the computational complexity of the core membership problem for the b-matching game as co-NP-hard, filling a gap in understanding for this class of cooperative games.
Findings
Core membership problem is co-NP-hard for b-matching games.
Resolves an open question in cooperative game theory.
Highlights computational difficulty even with structural properties similar to assignment problems.
Abstract
The core is a quintessential solution concept for profit sharing in cooperative game theory. An imputation allocates the worth of the given game among its agents. The imputation lies in the core of the game if, for each sub-coalition, the amount allocated to its agents is at least the worth of this sub-coalition. Hence, under a core imputation, each of exponentially many sub-coalitions gets satisfied. The following computational question has received much attention: Given an imputation, does it lie in the core? Clearly, this question lies in co-NP, since a co-NP certificate for this problem would be a sub-coalition which is not satisfied under the imputation. This question is in P for the assignment game [SS71] and has been shown to be co-NP-hard for several natural games, including max-flow [FZCD02] and MST [FKFH97]. The one natural game for which this question has remained open is the…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Advanced Graph Theory Research · Limits and Structures in Graph Theory
