When not to target negative ties? Studying competitive influence maximisation in signed networks

TL;DR

This paper investigates influence maximisation in signed networks with negative ties, comparing strategies that consider or ignore edge signs, and analyzes how network topology, resources, and competition affect outcomes.

Contribution

It introduces a comparative analysis of influence strategies in signed networks under competitive conditions, highlighting when considering negative ties is beneficial or detrimental.

Findings

Sign-aware strategies outperform sign-agnostic ones when resources are limited.

Ignoring negative ties can sometimes lead to better influence spread in competitive settings.

Considering negative ties can occasionally result in reduced influence, depending on the opponent's strategy.

Abstract

We explore the influence maximisation problem in networks with negative ties. Where prior work has focused on unsigned networks, we investigate the need to consider negative ties in networks while trying to maximise spread in a population - particularly under competitive conditions. Given a signed network we optimise the strategies of a focal controller, against competing influence in the network, using two approaches - either the focal controller uses a sign-agnostic approach or they factor in the sign of the edges while optimising their strategy. We compare the difference in vote-shares (or the share of population) obtained by both these methods to determine the need to navigate negative ties in these settings. More specifically, we study the impact of: (a) network topology, (b) resource conditions and (c) competitor strategies on the difference in vote shares obtained across both methodologies. We observe that gains are maximum when resources available to the focal controller are low and the competitor avoids negative edges in their strategy. Conversely, gains are insignificant irrespective of resource conditions when the competitor targets the network indiscriminately. Finally, we study the problem in a game-theoretic setting, where we simultaneously optimise the strategies of both competitors. Interestingly we observe that, strategising with the knowledge of negative ties can occasionally also lead to loss in vote-shares.