Satisfactory Budget Division
Laurent Gourv\`es, Michael Lampis, Nikolaos Melissinos, Aris, Pagourtzis

TL;DR
This paper investigates the problem of dividing a divisible budget among projects to satisfy agents' requests, analyzing the maximum satisfaction, existence of perfect divisions, computational complexity, and minimal total budget needed.
Contribution
It introduces a formal framework for budget satisfaction, studies various satisfaction thresholds, and addresses computational and existence questions for different scenarios.
Findings
Maximum proportion of satisfiable agents identified
Conditions for perfect satisfaction in certain instances established
Complexity results for satisfaction decision problems provided
Abstract
A divisible budget must be allocated to several projects, and agents are asked for their opinion on how much they would give to each project. We consider that an agent is satisfied by a division of the budget if, for at least a certain predefined number of projects, the part of the budget actually allocated to each project is at least as large as the amount the agent requested. The objective is to find a budget division that ``best satisfies'' the agents. In this context, different problems can be stated and we address the following ones. We study the largest proportion of agents that can be satisfied for any instance, classes of instances admitting a budget division that satisfies all agents, the complexity of deciding if, for a given instance, every agent can be satisfied, and finally the question of finding, for a given instance, the smallest total…
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Auction Theory and Applications · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge
