Constant-Factor Distortion Mechanisms for $k$-Committee Election
Haripriya Pulyassary, Chaitanya Swamy

TL;DR
This paper introduces mechanisms for $k$-committee elections that achieve constant-factor distortion using limited ordinal and cardinal information, addressing the challenge of selecting committees with minimal total agent costs in metric spaces.
Contribution
It presents the first algorithms for the $ ext{ell}$-centrum problem with $k ext{ge} 2$, achieving $O(1)$-distortion with limited queries per agent or overall.
Findings
Achieves $O(1)$-distortion with $O( ext{log} k ext{log} n)$ queries per agent.
Achieves $O(1)$-distortion with $O(k^2 ext{log}^2 n)$ total queries.
Provides an adaptive-sampling algorithm for the $ ext{ell}$-centrum $k$-clustering problem.
Abstract
In the -committee election problem, we wish to aggregate the preferences of agents over a set of alternatives and select a committee of alternatives that minimizes the cost incurred by the agents. While we typically assume that agent preferences are captured by a cardinal utility function, in many contexts we only have access to ordinal information, namely the agents' rankings over the outcomes. As preference rankings are not as expressive as cardinal utilities, a loss of efficiency is inevitable, and is quantified by the notion of \emph{distortion}. We study the problem of electing a -committee that minimizes the sum of the -largest costs incurred by the agents, when agents and candidates are embedded in a metric space. This problem is called the -centrum problem and captures both the utilitarian and egalitarian objectives. When , it is not…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
Taxonomy
TopicsInternet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
