Enforcing MAVLink Safety & Security Properties Via Refined Multiparty Session Types
Arthur Amorim, Max Taylor, Trevor Kann, William L. Harrison, Gary T., Leavens, Lance Joneckis

TL;DR
This paper proposes using refined multiparty session types to specify and enforce safe message sequences in MAVLink, enhancing safety and security in UAV communication protocols.
Contribution
It introduces a novel application of refined multiparty session types to model and prevent unsafe message sequences in UAV communication protocols like MAVLink.
Findings
Initial results show effective mitigation of safety issues.
The approach can exclude unsafe message sequences.
Potential for improved UAV communication security.
Abstract
A compromised system component can issue message sequences that are legal while also leading the overall system into unsafe states. Such stealthy attacks are challenging to characterize, because message interfaces in standard languages specify each individual message separately but do not specify safe sequences of messages. We present initial results from ongoing work applying refined multiparty session types as a mechanism for expressing and enforcing proper message usage to exclude unsafe sequences. We illustrate our approach by using refined multiparty session types to mitigate safety and security issues in the MAVLink protocol commonly used in UAVs.
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Taxonomy
TopicsAccess Control and Trust · Service-Oriented Architecture and Web Services · Distributed systems and fault tolerance
