The hardcore brokers: Core-periphery structure and political representation in Denmark's corporate elite network

TL;DR

This study analyzes Denmark's corporate elite network, revealing a core-periphery structure where highly connected directors, especially from smaller firms, are more likely to participate in government committees, highlighting network influence in political representation.

Contribution

It provides a comprehensive analysis of the entire Danish corporate board network, identifying core brokers and their role in political representation beyond large firms.

Findings

A highly connected core of 275 directors identified.

Network coreness strongly predicts participation in government committees.

Smaller firm directors benefit most from network centrality in political access.

Abstract

Who represents the corporate elite in democratic governance? Prior studies find a tightly integrated "inner circle" network representing the corporate elite politically across varieties of capitalism, yet they all rely on data from a highly select sample of leaders from only the largest corporations. We cast a wider net. Analyzing new data on all members of corporate boards in the Danish economy (200k directors in 120k boards), we locate 1500 directors that operate as brokers between local corporate networks. We measure their network coreness using k-core detection and find a highly connected core of 275 directors, half of which are affiliated with smaller firms or subsidiaries. Analyses show a strong positive association between director coreness and the likelihood of joining one of the 650 government committees epitomizing Denmark's social-corporatist model of governance (net of firm and director characteristics). The political network premium is largest for directors of smaller firms or subsidiaries, indicating that network coreness is a key driver of business political representation, especially for directors without claims to market power or weight in formal interest organizations.