CRSet: Private Non-Interactive Verifiable Credential Revocation
Felix Hoops, Jonas Gebele, Florian Matthes

TL;DR
CRSet is a privacy-preserving, non-interactive revocation mechanism for Verifiable Credentials that leverages Ethereum transactions to securely and privately publish revocation data, enabling local checks without revealing issuer activity.
Contribution
It introduces CRSet, a novel non-interactive revocation scheme that protects issuer privacy and is practical for real-world deployment using Ethereum as a secure publication medium.
Findings
CRSet can handle revocation data for approximately 170,000 VCs per Ethereum blob.
The scheme maintains privacy by preventing leakage of issuer activity.
Empirical evaluation confirms the scheme's effectiveness and efficiency.
Abstract
Like any digital certificate, Verifiable Credentials (VCs) require a way to revoke them in case of an error or key compromise. Existing solutions for VC revocation, most prominently Bitstring Status List, are not viable for many use cases because they may leak the issuer's activity, which in turn leaks internal business metrics. For instance, staff fluctuation through the revocation of employee IDs. We identify the protection of issuer activity as a key gap and propose a formal definition for a corresponding characteristic of a revocation mechanism. Then, we introduce CRSet, a non-interactive mechanism that trades some space efficiency to reach these privacy characteristics. For that, we provide a proof sketch. Issuers periodically encode revocation data and publish it via Ethereum blob-carrying transactions, ensuring secure and private availability. Relying Parties (RPs) can download…
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Taxonomy
TopicsPrivacy-Preserving Technologies in Data · Access Control and Trust
