The Manhattan Trap: Why a Race to Artificial Superintelligence is Self-Defeating

TL;DR

This paper argues that a competitive race to develop Artificial Superintelligence is dangerous and that international cooperation, rather than competition, is the safer and more strategic approach.

Contribution

It introduces the concept of a trust dilemma in ASI development and advocates for cooperation over competition to mitigate risks.

Findings

Race to ASI increases risk of conflict and loss of control.

International cooperation can effectively mitigate ASI development risks.

Trust-based strategies are more effective than competitive ones in ASI governance.

Abstract

This paper examines the strategic dynamics of international competition to develop Artificial Superintelligence (ASI). We argue that the same assumptions that might motivate the US to race to develop ASI also imply that such a race is extremely dangerous. These assumptions--that ASI would provide a decisive military advantage and that states are rational actors prioritizing survival--imply that a race would heighten three critical risks: great power conflict, loss of control of ASI systems, and the undermining of liberal democracy. Our analysis shows that ASI presents a trust dilemma rather than a prisoners dilemma, suggesting that international cooperation to control ASI development is both preferable and strategically sound. We conclude that cooperation is achievable.