Fair Division Beyond Monotone Valuations with Applications to Equitable Graph Partitioning
Siddharth Barman, Paritosh Verma

TL;DR
This paper explores fair division for agents with non-monotone preferences, establishing existence and algorithms for fair allocations in both divisible and indivisible settings, with applications to equitable graph partitioning.
Contribution
It introduces new fairness guarantees and algorithms for non-monotone valuation classes, extending fair division theory beyond traditional monotone assumptions.
Findings
EF divisions exist for subadditive, nonnegative valuations of cakes.
Existence of EFE3 allocations for indivisible items under subadditive valuations.
Efficient algorithms for equitable partitions with dense subgraphs.
Abstract
This paper studies fair division of divisible and indivisible items among agents whose cardinal preferences are not necessarily monotone. We establish the existence of fair divisions and develop approximation algorithms to compute them. We address two complementary valuation classes, subadditive and nonnegative, which go beyond monotone functions. Considering both the division of cake (divisible resources) and allocation of indivisible items, we obtain fairness guarantees in terms of (approximate) envy-freeness (EF) and equability (EQ). In the context of envy-freeness, we prove that an EF division of a cake always exists under cake valuations that are subadditive and globally nonnegative. This result complements the nonexistence of EF allocations for burnt cakes known for more general valuations. In the indivisible-items setting, we establish the existence of EFE3 allocations for…
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Taxonomy
TopicsLaw, Economics, and Judicial Systems
