Post-Quantum Stealth Address Protocols

TL;DR

This paper introduces three new post-quantum stealth address protocols based on lattice cryptography, enhancing quantum resistance and outperforming existing elliptic curve-based protocols in performance metrics.

Contribution

The paper presents three novel lattice-based stealth address protocols that are resistant to quantum attacks, improving security and efficiency over traditional elliptic curve methods.

Findings

Module-LWE SAP outperforms ECPDKSAP by 66.8% in scan time.

Lattice-based protocols provide quantum resistance for stealth addresses.

The protocols leverage Learning With Errors (LWE) for enhanced privacy.

Abstract

The Stealth Address Protocol (SAP) allows users to receive assets through stealth addresses that are unlinkable to their stealth meta-addresses. The most widely used SAP, Dual-Key SAP (DKSAP), and the most performant SAP, Elliptic Curve Pairing Dual-Key SAP (ECPDKSAP), are based on elliptic curve cryptography, which is vulnerable to quantum attacks. These protocols depend on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem, which could be efficiently solved on a sufficiently powerful quantum computer using the Shor algorithm. In this paper three novel post-quantum SAPs based on lattice-based cryptography are presented: LWE SAP, Ring-LWE SAP and Module-LWE SAP. These protocols leverage Learning With Errors (LWE) problem to ensure quantum-resistant privacy. Among them, Module-LWE SAP, which is based on the Kyber key encapsulation mechanism, achieves the best performance and outperforms ECPDKSAP by approximately 66.8% in the scan time of the ephemeral public key registry.