Task Allocation in Customer-led Two-sided Markets with Satellite Constellation Services

TL;DR

This paper introduces a customer-led Stackelberg game model for task allocation in two-sided markets, demonstrating improved efficiency and market performance through satellite constellation services case studies.

Contribution

It proposes a novel customer-led game model for task allocation, proving equilibrium existence and showing significant benefits over traditional models.

Findings

23% reduction in customer payments

6.7-fold increase in company revenues

Effective in satellite constellation services market

Abstract

Multi-agent systems (MAS) are increasingly applied to complex task allocation in two-sided markets, where agents such as companies and customers interact dynamically. Traditional company-led Stackelberg game models, where companies set service prices, and customers respond, struggle to accommodate diverse and personalised customer demands in emerging markets like crowdsourcing. This paper proposes a customer-led Stackelberg game model for cost-efficient task allocation, where customers initiate tasks as leaders, and companies create their strategies as followers to meet these demands. We prove the existence of Nash Equilibrium for the follower game and Stackelberg Equilibrium for the leader game while discussing their uniqueness under specific conditions, ensuring cost-efficient task allocation and improved market performance. Using the satellite constellation services market as a real-world case, experimental results show a 23% reduction in customer payments and a 6.7-fold increase in company revenues, demonstrating the model's effectiveness in emerging markets.