Masking Countermeasures Against Side-Channel Attacks on Quantum Computers

TL;DR

This paper introduces a transpiler modification for quantum computers that enhances security against side-channel attacks by hiding circuit information, with practical implementation on IBM's quantum hardware.

Contribution

It presents a novel transpiler-based method to protect quantum circuits from side-channel attacks, including practical implementation details.

Findings

Protection achieved with linear circuit depth increase

Implementation demonstrated on IBM quantum computers

Effective shielding of specific gates from attacks

Abstract

We propose a modification to the transpiler of a quantum computer to safeguard against side-channel attacks aimed at learning information about a quantum circuit. We demonstrate that if it is feasible to shield a specific subset of gates from side-channel attacks, then it is possible to conceal all information in a quantum circuit by transpiling it into a new circuit whose depth grows linearly, depending on the quantum computer's architecture. We provide concrete examples of implementing this protection on IBM's quantum computers, utilizing their virtual gates and editing their transpiler.