Combined effect of incentives and coupling in multigames in two-layer networks
Luo-Luo Jiang, Yi-Ming Li, Wen-Jing Li, Attila Szolnoki

TL;DR
This paper investigates how incentives and external coupling in multi-layer networks promote cooperation and reduce inequality, using a novel framework with diverse game types and real-world network features.
Contribution
It introduces a multi-layer network model with external coupling and incentive mechanisms, providing new insights into cooperation and inequality dynamics in complex systems.
Findings
External coupling and incentives increase cooperation rates.
Lower Gini coefficients indicate reduced inequality.
Regular networks foster micro-level cooperation phenomena.
Abstract
The lack of cooperation can easily result in inequality among members of a society, which provides an increasing gap between individual incomes. To tackle this issue, we introduce an incentive mechanism based on individual strategies and incomes, wherein a portion of the income from defectors is allocated to reward low-income cooperators, aiming to enhance cooperation by improving the equitable distribution of wealth across the entire population. Moreover, previous research has typically employed network structures or game mechanisms characterized by homogeneity. In this study, we present a network framework that more accurately reflects real-world conditions, where agents are engaged in multiple games, including prisoner's dilemma games in the top-layer and public good games in the down-layer networks. Within this framework, we introduce the concept of ``external coupling'' which…
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