Banzhaf Power in Hierarchical Voting Games
John Randolph, Denizalp Goktas, Amy Greenwald

TL;DR
This paper introduces Extended BPI (EBPI), a generalized measure of voting power applicable to unbalanced hierarchical voting games, improving computational efficiency and applicability to real-world scenarios like sentiment analysis.
Contribution
It generalizes BPI to unbalanced voting games through EBPI and demonstrates its computational advantages and practical application in language sentiment modeling.
Findings
EBPI simplifies to BPI in balanced games
Decomposition of BPI in unbalanced games uses EBPI at each hierarchy level
Significant runtime improvements in sentiment analysis application
Abstract
The Banzhaf Power Index (BPI) is a method of measuring the power of voters in determining the outcome of a voting game. Some voting games exhibit a hierarchical structure, including the US electoral college and ensemble learning methods; we call such games hierarchical voting games. It is generally understood that BPI in hierarchical voting games can be computed via a recursive decomposition of the hierarchy, which can substantially reduce the calculation's complexity. We identify a key (previously undocumented) assumption on which this decomposition is based, namely balance, meaning one group of voters has enough votes to win whenever the complementary group of voters does not, and vice versa. We then introduce a generalization of BPI that we call Extended BPI (EBPI) for all voting games, including those that are not balanced, which simplifies to BPI in balanced games. We show that BPI…
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