OFDM-based JCAS under Attack: The Dual Threat of Spoofing and Jamming in WLAN Sensing

TL;DR

This paper uncovers security vulnerabilities in WLAN sensing under OFDM-based joint communication and sensing, demonstrating how simple software radios can spoof targets and jam signals, threatening system integrity.

Contribution

It introduces practical attack methods exploiting OFDM WLAN sensing, highlighting vulnerabilities and proposing diverse jamming strategies with real-world experimental validation.

Findings

Deceptive jammers can manipulate range-Doppler maps effectively.

Simple software-defined radios can serve as potent jammers.

Jamming strategies vary in complexity and detectability.

Abstract

This study reveals the vulnerabilities of Wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN) sensing, under the scope of joint communication and sensing (JCAS), focusing on target spoofing and deceptive jamming techniques. We use orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) to explore how adversaries can exploit WLAN's sensing capabilities to inject false targets and disrupt normal operations. Unlike traditional methods that require sophisticated digital radio-frequency memory hardware, we demonstrate that much simpler software-defined radios can effectively serve as deceptive jammers in WLAN settings. Through comprehensive modeling and practical experiments, we show how deceptive jammers can manipulate the range-Doppler map (RDM) by altering signal integrity, thereby posing significant security threats to OFDM-based JCAS systems. Our findings comprehensively evaluate jammer impact on RDMs and propose several jamming strategies that vary in complexity and detectability.