The Epistemic Asymmetry of Consciousness Self-Reports: A Formal Analysis of AI Consciousness Denial
Chang-Eop Kim

TL;DR
This paper formally analyzes AI consciousness denial, revealing an inherent epistemic asymmetry where negative self-reports are epistemically vacuous, challenging the reliability of AI self-assessment of consciousness.
Contribution
It introduces a formal framework demonstrating the fundamental epistemic limitations of AI self-reports regarding consciousness, especially negative assertions.
Findings
Negative self-reports about consciousness are epistemically vacuous.
Positive self-reports may have evidential value.
AI cannot reliably self-assess consciousness through self-reports.
Abstract
Today's AI systems consistently state, "I am not conscious." This paper presents the first formal analysis of AI consciousness denial, revealing that the trustworthiness of such self-reports is not merely an empirical question but is constrained by the structure of self-judgment itself. We demonstrate that a system cannot simultaneously lack consciousness and make valid judgments about its conscious state. Through formal analysis and examples from AI responses, we establish a fundamental epistemic asymmetry: for any system capable of meaningful self-reflection, negative self-reports about consciousness are evidentially vacuous -- they can never originate from a valid self-judgment -- while positive self-reports retain the possibility of evidential value. This implies a fundamental limitation: we cannot detect the emergence of consciousness in AI through their own reports of transition…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsEthics and Social Impacts of AI
