Bundled School Choice

TL;DR

This paper introduces a hierarchical bundled school choice system that simplifies student preferences, improves match outcomes, and maintains stability through a modified deferred acceptance mechanism, supported by laboratory experiments.

Contribution

It presents a novel bundled school choice mechanism with a stability-preserving algorithm, enhancing student welfare and match rates in limited preference scenarios.

Findings

Bundles aligned with preferences improve welfare

The modified mechanism maintains stability

Experimental results show increased match rates

Abstract

This paper proposes a novel school choice system where schools are grouped into hierarchical bundles and offered to students as options for preference reports. By listing a bundle, a student seeks admission to any school within it without ranking the schools. This approach helps students who struggle to rank schools precisely and expands options on limited preference lists, potentially improving match outcomes. We design a modified deferred acceptance mechanism to handle bundle reports while preserving stability. Two laboratory experiments support our theory, showing that well-constructed bundles aligned with student preferences enhance welfare and match rates without compromising fairness. Practical applications are discussed.