A Bureaucratic Theory of Statistics
Benjamin Recht

TL;DR
This paper presents a framework viewing statistics as a bureaucratic tool for policy-making, emphasizing pre-data collection rules that underpin governance and reduce interpretative debates.
Contribution
It introduces the concept of 'ex ante policy' as a new way to understand the bureaucratic role of statistics in governance and policy.
Findings
Ex ante policies provide clear rules for future actions.
Statistics serve as a bureaucratic calculus for governance.
The framework reduces debates over statistical interpretation.
Abstract
This commentary proposes a framework for understanding the role of statistics in policy-making, regulation, and bureaucratic systems. I introduce the concept of "ex ante policy," describing statistical rules and procedures designed before data collection to govern future actions. Through examining examples, particularly clinical trials, I explore how ex ante policy serves as a calculus of bureaucracy, providing numerical foundations for governance through clear, transparent rules. The ex ante frame obviates heated debates about inferential interpretations of probability and statistical tests, p-values, and rituals. I conclude by calling for a deeper appreciation of statistics' bureaucratic function and suggesting new directions for research in policy-oriented statistical methodology.
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Taxonomy
TopicsAdvanced Causal Inference Techniques · Statistical Methods in Clinical Trials · Meta-analysis and systematic reviews
