Can the ontology of Bohmian mechanics consists only in particles? The PBR theorem says no

TL;DR

This paper argues that in Bohmian mechanics, the universal wave function cannot be purely nomological if the effective wave function is ontic, challenging the idea that the ontology consists only of particles.

Contribution

It demonstrates the incompatibility between the nomological view and the ontic view of the wave function in Bohmian mechanics, especially in light of the PBR theorem.

Findings

The PBR theorem implies the universal wave function is ontic.

Nomological and ontic views of the wave function are incompatible.

RDMP ontology can address objections to psi-ontology.

Abstract

The meaning of the wave function is an important unresolved issue in Bohmian mechanics. On the one hand, according to the nomological view, the wave function of the universe or the universal wave function is nomological, like a law of nature. On the other hand, the PBR theorem proves that the wave function in quantum mechanics or the effective wave function in Bohmian mechanics is ontic, representing the ontic state of a physical system in the universe. It is usually thought that the nomological view of the universal wave function is compatible with the ontic view of the effective wave function, and thus the PBR theorem has no implications for the nomological view. In this paper, I argue that this is not the case, and these two views are in fact incompatible. This means that if the effective wave function is ontic as the PBR theorem proves, then the universal wave function cannot be nomological, and the ontology of Bohmian mechanics cannot consist only in particles. This incompatibility result holds true not only for Humeanism and dispositionalism but also for primitivism about laws of nature, which attributes a fundamental ontic role to the universal wave function. Moreover, I argue that although the nomological view can be held by rejecting one key assumption of the PBR theorem, the rejection will lead to serious problems, such as that the results of measurements and their probabilities cannot be explained in ontology in Bohmian mechanics. Finally, I briefly discuss three psi-ontologies, namely a physical field in a fundamental high-dimensional space, a multi-field in three-dimensional space, and RDMP (Random Discontinuous Motion of Particles) in three-dimensional space, and argue that the RDMP ontology can answer the objections to the psi-ontology raised by the proponents of the nomological view.