
TL;DR
This paper introduces a model for aggregating tolerance intervals in legal standards, establishing axioms and analyzing endpoint rules like extreme tolerance and median-based majoritarianism.
Contribution
It formulates a new framework for tolerance aggregation using axioms and characterizes endpoint rules including extreme tolerance and median rules.
Findings
Endpoint rules include extreme tolerance and median rule.
Axioms lead to characterization of these aggregation methods.
The model informs legal standards of tolerance.
Abstract
I propose a model of aggregation of intervals relevant to the study of legal standards of tolerance. Seven axioms: responsiveness, anonymity, continuity, strategyproofness, and three variants of neutrality are then used to prove several important results about a new class of aggregation methods called endpoint rules. The class of endpoint rules includes extreme tolerance (allowing anything permitted by anyone) and a form of majoritarianism (the median rule).
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Game Theory and Applications · Qualitative Comparative Analysis Research
