Lyapunov-based Resilient Secondary Synchronization Strategy of AC Microgrids Under Exponentially Energy-Unbounded FDI Attacks

TL;DR

This paper develops Lyapunov-based distributed control strategies for AC microgrids that are resilient against a wide range of energy-unbounded FDI cyber attacks, ensuring stable operation and power sharing.

Contribution

It introduces novel attack-resilient secondary control methods with rigorous Lyapunov proofs for inverter-based microgrids under severe cyber threats.

Findings

Ensures UUB convergence for frequency and voltage regulation under attacks.

Validated effectiveness through simulations on IEEE 34-bus system.

Demonstrated real-time robustness with Hardware-in-the-Loop experiments.

Abstract

This article presents fully distributed Lyapunov-based attack-resilient secondary control strategies for islanded inverter-based AC microgrids, designed to counter a broad spectrum of energy-unbounded False Data Injection (FDI) attacks, including exponential attacks, targeting control input channels. While distributed control improves scalability and reliability, it also increases susceptibility to cyber threats. The proposed strategies, supported by rigorous Lyapunov-based proofs, ensure uniformly ultimately bounded (UUB) convergence for frequency regulation, voltage containment, and power sharing, even under severe cyber attacks. The effectiveness of the proposed approach has been demonstrated through case studies on a modified IEEE 34-bus system, leveraging simulations and real-time Hardware-in-the-Loop experiments with OPAL-RT.